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Risk  preferences  play a crucial  role in  a great  variety  of  economic  decisions.  Measuring  risk
preferences  reliably  is  therefore  an  important  challenge.  In  this  paper  we  ask the  question
whether  risk  preferences  observed  in economic  experiments  reﬂect  real-life  risky  choice
behaviour. We  investigate  in  a sample  representative  for  a  rural  region  of  eastern  Uganda
whether  pursuing  farming  strategies  with  both  a higher  expected  proﬁt  and greater  vari-
ance of  proﬁts  is associated  with  willingness  to take  risks  in an  experiment.  Controlling
for  other  determinants  of risk-taking  in agriculture,  we  ﬁnd  that  risky  choice  behaviour  in
the  experiment  is  correlated  with  risky  choice  behaviour  in  real life  in  one  domain,  i.e. the
purchase  of fertiliser,  but  not  in other  domains,  i.e. the  growing  of cash crops  and  market-
orientation  more  broadly.  Our  ﬁndings  suggest  that  economic  experiments  may  be good at
capturing  real-world  risky  choice  behaviour  that  is narrowly  bracketed.
©  2016  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the
CC BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
For adoption of new technologies and thereby economic growth to take place in society, risky investments need to be
undertaken. Reward for risk-taking typically comes in the form of a higher return on investment, which is necessary to
induce risk-averse investors to put up with larger variation in possible outcomes. One component of research on risky
investment decisions is therefore the appropriate measurement of risk aversion, for which economic experiments are often
used.1 The idea is that by stripping away from real-life investment all incidental features, so that only the pure decision task
of trading off variation against return remains, risk aversion can be observed in isolation and therefore measured precisely.
The assumption is that risk preferences observed in the lab reﬂect those in real life.
 We  thank Joshua Balungira and his team at The Field Lab in eastern Uganda for excellent assistance in collecting the data and gratefully acknowledge
joint  funding from the UK’s ESRC and DFID (Grant ES/J008893/1).
∗ Corresponding author at: School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 01603 592806;
fax:  +44 01603 451999.
E-mail address: a.verschoor@uea.ac.uk (A. Verschoor).
1 See Harrison and Rutström (2008) and Charness et al. (2013) for recent surveys.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.009
0167-2681/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/).
U
t
l
t
e
w
H
o
a
f
s
t
t
e
a
a
a
8
o
s
o
t
t
w
f
m
t
m
m
t
w
t
u
c
(
t
t
f
2
o
l
i
i
d
s
2
T
M
b
iA. Verschoor et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 128 (2016) 134–148 135
We  test this assumption using a lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment. For a representative sample from a farming region in eastern
ganda, we examine whether subjects’ risk-taking in a Gneezy and Potters (1997) type investment game is associated with
heir risk-taking in agriculture. Farmers, more than most other groups in society, are used to dealing with uncertainty in their
ivelihoods decisions due to the numerous factors that cause ﬂuctuations in yields and in the prices of inputs and outputs:
he weather, pests, soil fertility, and so forth. Farmers’ attitudes to risk have been extensively studied in lab-in-the-ﬁeld
xperiments, both in developed and in developing countries.2 We  consider livelihoods decisions that in developed countries
ould probably not be considered as risk-taking in agriculture: fertiliser purchase and commercialisation more broadly.
owever, as we show in the paper, in our context, the decisions we consider, which increase participation in inputs and
utputs markets, raise both the expected value and the variance of proﬁts compared to the traditional, semi-subsistence
griculture that is still common in the region.3
The Achilles’ heel of any research that links real-life and experimental behaviour is the potential inﬂuence of confounding
actors, which gets at the heart of why we do experiments in the ﬁrst place. If this risk could be eliminated, there would
trictly speaking not be any need for experiments, so it needs instead to be minimised as best one can. We have attempted
o do so by selecting an area that is homogeneous in terms of culture and agricultural conditions and practices, so that
hese do not represent confounding factors. Moreover, to minimise the risk of omitted variables bias, we  control in the
conometric analysis for the other factors that previous literature on risk-taking in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa identiﬁes
s determinants (Heltberg and Tarp, 2002; Knight et al., 2003; Vargas Hill, 2009); we collected data on these variables through
 tailor-made questionnaire.
We  selected through implementing a multistage cluster sampling design, a representative sample of 1803 farmers: among
ll of these the questionnaire was administered (including a hypothetical investment question) and a randomly selected
72 participated in the investment game (the second number is lower than the ﬁrst for reasons of resources). Controlling for
ther determinants of risk-taking in agriculture, we  ﬁnd that risk-taking in the experiment is associated with the relatively
traightforward investment decision of fertiliser purchase. However, for more involved livelihoods strategies that call not
nly on willingness to take risks but also on other attributes of entrepreneurship, viz. moving away from subsistence farming
o growing crops for the market (measured in two alternative ways), we  ﬁnd no evidence of an association with risk-taking in
he experiment. By contrast, a hypothetical willingness to take large-scale risks, elicited through a questionnaire, is associated
ith both fertiliser purchase and growing crops for the market (however measured), suggesting that this is a better proxy
or entrepreneurship broadly deﬁned.
We see our main contribution to the literature as follows. We  link risk-taking investment in the lab to risk-taking invest-
ent in real life: unlike in previous studies, both the expected value and variance of proﬁts are greater in the risky alternatives
han in the safe one, in the real-life application and in the experiments. We  show that this holds for the agricultural invest-
ent measures we consider compared to the traditional agriculture that is still common in the study area. We  thus see the
ain contribution of our paper as comparing real-life and lab behaviour that a priori is expected to be similar.
To the best of our knowledge, previous studies do not compare risk-taking behaviour in the lab and in real life in which
he expected value and the variance of proﬁts are greater in both situations. Strictly speaking, like is therefore not compared
ith like. Whereas variance of proﬁts and expected proﬁts are always greater in the risky option in the lab, this does not
end to be the case in the real-world behaviour that it is compared with, in previous studies.
Sometimes, the real-world behaviour compared with risky choice in the lab is behaviour that is unsafe but does not
nambiguously have a higher expected value than the safe alternative: gambling (Lejuez et al., 2003; Hardeweg et al., 2013),
igarette smoking and heavy drinking (Anderson and Mellor, 2008), or the consumption of food that entails a health risk
Lusk and Coble, 2005). In other studies, risky choice in the lab is linked to real-world technology adoption that reduces
he variance of proﬁts: Bt cotton by Chinese farmers (Liu, 2013) or GM corn and GM soy by Midwestern grain farmers in
he USA (Barham et al., 2014). In yet other studies, the real-world behaviours studied have ambiguous effects: Chinese
armers’ (often excessive) use of pesticides (Liu and Huang, 2013) and self-employment in rural Thailand (Hardeweg et al.,
013) may  reduce both the expected value and the variance of outcomes, increase both, or reduce one and increase the
ther.
Instead, we consider risk-taking investment both in the experiment and in real life. We  see our main contribution as
inking experimental and real-world behaviours that are conceptually comparable: for taking risk, a higher expected return
s offered both in the lab and in life. Our advantage on previous studies is thus that we  do not compare risk-taking investment
n the lab with gambling, unsafe behaviour or risk-reducing investment: the absence of a correlation in such comparisons
oes not reliably inform us whether the behaviour in the lab conforms to that in real life, since the behaviours are not strictly
peaking comparable. For example, there is no good reason why  somebody willing to take risk for the sake of a higher return
2 Examples include farmers in Chile (Henrich and McElreath, 2002), China (Liu, 2013), Ethiopia (Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004b; Yesuf and Bluffstone,
009; Harrison et al., 2010), France (Reynaud and Couture, 2012), India (Binswanger, 1980, 1981; Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004b; Harrison et al., 2010),
anzania (Henrich and McElreath, 2002), Thailand (Hardeweg et al., 2013), Uganda (Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004a; Harrison et al., 2010; Tanaka and
unro, 2014), the USA (Herberich and List, 2012) and Vietnam (Tanaka et al., 2010).
3 Consistent with what we show for Ugandan farmers, Duo et al. (2008, p. 486) show for Kenyan farmers that buying fertiliser is proﬁtable on average
ut  leaves them worse off in some circumstances. Studies of risk-taking in agriculture in developing countries often focus on reliance on the market for
nputs or outputs: see e.g. Engle-Warnick et al. (2007), Heltberg and Tarp (2002), Knight et al. (2003) and Vargas Hill (2009).
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should ceteris paribus also be prone to gambling, or eating unsafe foods. By instead considering comparable behaviours, we
test the external validity of the experimental measure.4
A second contribution of our paper is that we have a large, representative sample in which there is considerable variation
in the real-life behaviour of interest (itself rare in papers of this kind). Importantly, the agricultural investment behaviour
we study has the potential to get semi-subsistence farmers out of poverty (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011), by taking the
sort of risk that we also study experimentally. We  thus have a comparison of experimental and real-life behaviour that is
not only conceptually tight (both are risk-taking investment) but also involves tremendously important behaviour: the type
that can help poor farmers escape from poverty.
A third contribution is our conceptual framework, which uses the choice bracketing concept developed by Read et al.
(1999) and elaborated in Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009). We  show that choice bracketing helps to see when risk-taking
investment behaviour could be different in the lab and real life. The term choice bracket refers to the decisions that are
considered together by the decision maker. When a real-world behaviour and a lab behaviour are compared, the assumption
is that both are narrowly bracketed, i.e. are not considered together with other decisions. If that assumption is violated, then
the comparison is no longer valid. For instance, if the risky choice decision in the lab is considered in isolation by the decision
maker, but the real-world risky choice decision is not, then we should not necessarily expect similar behaviour in the lab
and in real life.
A fourth contribution is the comparison of the performance of hypothetical and experimental measures of risk attitudes
in explaining real-world investment behaviour. The hypotetical measure we consider involves larger stakes and captures
losses, which experimental measures are limited in capturing.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant theoretical considerations and implica-
tions for the empirical strategy. In economic theory, the ﬁnding of correspondence between risky choice behaviour in real
life and an experiment is not self-evident. As we  explain in this section, the narrow bracketing of both the real-world and
experimental decisions compared in the research (i.e. the decision-maker does not consider their consequences together
with the consequences of other decisions) needs to be assumed for a correspondence between the manifestations of risky
choice to be expected. Section 3 describes the methods of data collection and the main variables used in the analysis. Sec-
tion 4 contains descriptive statistics, spearman correlations between real-world, hypothetical and experimental measures of
risk preferences, and regression analysis of the real-world measures on the experimental and hypothetical measures, as well
as any potentially confounding variables that we  have data on. Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings of the paper and concludes.
As we argue there, when a correspondence is found, as in our case, between experimental and real-life decision-making in
some but not in other domains, then dissimilar choice bracketing across domains provides a possible explanation.
2. Theoretical considerations and empirical strategy
Under which conditions would risky choice in an experiment reﬂect risky choice in real life? First, as discussed in the
introduction, like must be compared with like. We  focus on real-world risky choice that, like in the experiment we  organised,
is between options in which a higher expected value of proﬁts always comes at the cost of a higher variance. In order to
show that this is the case, we compute expected and variance of proﬁts in accordance with price, yield and costs scenarios
based on information provided to us by the agricultural extension ofﬁcers and other experts that advise the farmers in our
sampling area (see Section 3.3).
Second, the choice bracket that the decision-maker applies should be such that the comparison of real-world and exper-
imental behaviour remains valid. For example, if the real-world investment behaviour is part of (unobserved) portfolio
management, then the comparison is no longer valid. The term choice bracket refers to the group of choices whose conse-
quences are considered together by the decision-maker (Read et al., 1999). For prima facie comparable experimental and
real-world choices, if both are narrowly bracketed,  then the comparison remains valid. To make this point precisely, we
adopt the notation and deﬁnition of narrow bracketing of Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009, p. 1511). A decision-maker who
faces I different choice sets M1, . . .,  MI is a narrow bracketer if she considers each choice set in isolation. A choice mi ∈ Mi is
thus made through evaluating the resulting probability distribution Li(xi|mi) over changes in wealth xi ∈ R, but not through
evaluating the distribution F(xI|m)  over the sum of wealth changes xI = ixi resulting from the vector of choices m = (m1, . . .,
mI).
4 A number of recent studies have examined the internal validity of experimental methods for eliciting risk preferences, addressing the issue of whether
they  reliably measure what they ought to measure, through examining inconsistent risk preferences and through considering the stability of risk preferences
across experimental set-ups (Dave et al., 2010; Charness and Viceisza, 2012; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). Others have looked at the stability of risk
preferences between experimental and questionnaire elicitation methods (Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Lonnqvist et al., 2011), and using questionnaires,
between domains of real life (Maccrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Weber et al., 2002; Hanoch et al., 2006) and between variously framed questions and
domains of real life (Dohmen et al., 2011). Our study looks instead at the stability of risk preferences between experiments and real life and is thus a test of
the  external validity of the experimental method for eliciting risk preferences. Indirect clues of external validity have been implicitly achieved in studies
that  link experimental risk preferences with subject characteristics that in turn are known to be associated with differential real-world risk-taking: gender
(Charness and Gneezy, 2012), higher levels of masculinity (Apicella et al., 2008) and poverty (Tanaka et al., 2010) provide some examples. Direct validation
is  preferable because it avoids the confounding inﬂuence of these mediating characteristics.
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Without loss of generality, we can call M1 the choice set generated by the experiment, M2, . . .,  MI the choice sets faced in
eal life, and M2 the choice set that forms the basis of the comparison of real-world and experimental risk preferences. If the
nalyst uses m1 and m2 for assessing, respectively, experimental and real-world risk preferences when M1 and/or M2 are not
arrowly bracketed, then the comparison is no longer necessarily valid. To see this, suppose that M1 is narrowly bracketed
ut M2 is not.5 In that case, m1 derives from evaluating L1(x1|m1); and m2 derives, not from L2(x2|m2), which would be
equired for a valid comparison, but from the summed distribution that results from including some or all of m3, . . .,  mI,
epending on how broad the choice bracket is. An example relevant in our context would be the growing of a cash crop,
ore risky than traditional agriculture when considered in isolation, as part of a livelihoods diversiﬁcation strategy, so for
urposes of risk management. In that example, an assessment of risk preferences focused on m2 alone would underestimate
isk aversion and invalidate the comparison with experimentally assessed risk preferences.
For risky choice in experiments to reﬂect real-life risky choice, narrow bracketing thus needs to hold in both domains.
ecision-making pertaining to the latter should proceed in a piecemeal, one-at-a-time fashion, in which changes to wealth,
ather than wealth levels, are considered as the carriers of utility. The major theories of choice in economics differ in terms
f how they view decision-making in this respect and therefore in their implications for the correspondence between
xperimental and real-world risky choice. In expected utility theory, risk aversion captured by the concavity of the utility
unction of wealth would be invisible in the lab, because of the small stakes involved (Rabin, 2000); in prospect theory,
hich only considers changes to wealth relative to a reference level, correspondence between the two  domains is assured
rovided both are narrowly bracketed (cf. Thaler, 1999); and in the reference-dependent utility theory developed by Köszegi
nd Rabin (2006, 2007), which marries expected utility theory and prospect theory and in which utility thus derives both
rom changes to and from levels of wealth, correspondence between the two  should be partial and greater the more the
ormer (so-called gain-loss utility) counts for decision-making compared to the latter (consumption utility). In the face of
arying theoretical support, a test of the hypothesis that risky choice in experiments reﬂects that in real life needs to maintain
he assumption of narrow bracketing in both choice sets that give rise to the behaviours compared in the analysis.
The third condition that needs to be met  for risky choice in experiments to reﬂect risky choice in real life is that determi-
ants of the latter other than but correlated with risk preferences are controlled for. We selected a representative sample
rom a culturally, economically, ecologically and agriculturally homogeneous area, and administered a questionnaire among
xperimental participants designed to measure both risky agricultural investment comprehensively and the factors that
revious studies have identiﬁed as its major determinants (see Section 3.4). We  thus minimise the risk of omitted variables
ias through avoiding intra-sample variation in contextual confounds and through controlling in regression analysis for the
nown co-determinants of our real-world risky choice variables.
If these conditions are met, then we should have a valid test of whether risk preferences are stable across the two
omains considered: an experiment and real-life agricultural investment. In short, our empirical strategy is as follows. We
elect a representative sample from a population consisting of people similar in customs and livelihoods, observe risky
hoice behaviour in agriculture and its potential determinants among them, and observe their risky choice behaviour in an
xperiment. We specify a value function over experimental earnings in order to measure risk aversion and, controlling for
ther factors, regress risk-taking in agriculture variables on this risk aversion measure.
If this test fails to detect stable risk preferences, then dissimilar bracketing in the domains considered is a possible expla-
ation. This could happen if, for instance, the experimental day is a natural bracket, but individual agricultural investment
ecisions are considered as part of a diversiﬁed portfolio.
. Methods and data
In this section we describe our research site, our main variables of interest and how we collected data on these.
.1. Study area
We  selected a representative sample of 1803 farmers from a rural area in eastern Uganda: Sironko District and Lower
ulambuli District, which together comprise the former Sironko District; for details on sample selection, see Section 3.5. This
rea has a current estimated population size of about 300,000, most of whom are from the Bagisu ethnic group (and if not,
ave adopted their customs), and a total land area of 1270 km2.6 About 95 percent of people are primarily engaged in own-
ccount crop farming, with the remainder typically growing crops as a secondary activity in addition to salaried employment.
verage land holdings are about 1.5 acres, there are very few big farmers in the region, and irrigation use is low. The key
istinction between farmers of interest to this paper is that between those who  stick to traditional semi-subsistence farming
nd those who have become more market-oriented, in one form or another. The former mostly grow maize intercropped with
5 A bracket can of course be narrower than the choice set generated by the experiment, i.e. individual experimental decisions may be considered separately
ven  when presented together, for which ample evidence exists (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Camerer, 1989; Battalio et al., 1990; Redelmeier and
versky, 1992; Rabin and Weizsäcker, 2009).
6 The information presented in this paragraph is taken from the District Local Government Five Year District Development Plans (2010/11–2014/15) for
ironko  and Bulambuli.
138 A. Verschoor et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 128 (2016) 134–148
beans and often, on a very small scale, some coffee and bananas; the food crops are primarily for their own consumption, but
a small proportion of the harvest may  be sold, as is the coffee. Reliance on bought agricultural inputs is minimal among these
semi-subsistence farmers. The more market-oriented farmers rely for their farming more on bought inputs such as improved
seeds, pesticides and fertiliser, would hire labour during peak seasons, and grow, in addition to the crops mentioned, more
lucrative but input-intensive crops such as cabbages, tomatoes, onions and aubergines. This typology is fairly crude and in
reality reliance on markets for inputs and/or outputs takes place along a continuum. As described below, we made use of
expert advice to convert the distinction outlined between livelihoods strategies into variables that capture risk-taking in
agriculture. In this section, we describe how we collected data on our main variables of interest.
3.2. Elicitation of risk preferences in the experiment
In previous risky choice experiments in developing countries, four main methods have been used for measuring risk
aversion. We  piloted three of these, each among 20 subjects: the Gneezy and Potters (1997) method, which is an investment
game; the Eckel and Grossman (2002) method, an ordered lottery selection design that is itself an adaptation of the classic
Binswanger (1980, 1981) design; and the multiple price list method due to Holt and Laury (2002).7 Unlike previous studies
of risk preferences among subjects with little formal education (Dave et al., 2010; Charness and Viceisza, 2012), we found
comprehension of the Holt and Laury method to be good, but it required cumbersome implementation. The other two
methods were both easy to implement and well understood by pilot subjects. We chose the Gneezy and Potters method
because it readily accommodates a larger array of choices, and therefore a narrower range of risk aversion corresponding
with each choice, than the Eckel and Grossman method. The other reason we preferred it over the other two is that the
decision subjects are asked to take may  readily be framed as an investment decision, which allows for a natural comparison
with the real-life behaviours we consider.8
In our design, subjects are endowed with 20 counters, each representing 400 shillings, so 8000 shillings in total, or about
twice average daily earnings in the area. They choose to invest k counters, where k ∈ {0, 1, . . .,  20}  for facing the lottery
(0.5, 8000 − 400k ; 0.5, 8000 + 800k). In other words, their investment is tripled if successful and lost in its entirety if it fails.9
The fate of their investment is determined by tossing a coin. Experimental instructions are simple and easy to follow (see
Appendix A).
We  assume a power Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function over experimental earnings x, which is
deﬁned as U(x) = x1−r/(1 − r), where r is the coefﬁcient of CRRA. As is conventional, we compute the CRRA coefﬁcient for
indifference between investing k and k − 1, on the one hand, and k and k + 1 on the other, to ﬁnd the CRRA coefﬁcient range
that corresponds with the observed behaviour of investing k.
The advantage of this measure is that it is incentivised, the disadvantage that it is for small stakes and does not involve
real losses, unlike real-life investment. We  therefore also asked subjects a hypothetical investment question, adapted from
Dohmen et al. (2005, p. 18), about their willingness to invest y ∈ { 0, 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, 80,000, 100,000 } in an asset
that yields a return of 100 percent if successful and minus 50 percent if a failure, with equal probability. Subjects chose one
of six decision cards on which the two outcomes of a possible choice were clearly displayed.
It is possible to compute a CRRA coefﬁcient for the responses to the hypothetical investment question in the same way
as for choices made in the experiment, but because we  cannot observe loss aversion, we prefer to treat them as an ordinal
measure of risk aversion.3.3. Measuring risk-taking agricultural investment
A measure of risk-taking agricultural investment that suits the aim of this study should capture investment that raises
both the expected value and the variability of outcomes, compared to traditional agriculture. Purchasing fertiliser is the iconic
example. Although proﬁtable on average, in some circumstances such as critically low output prices or a harvest failure due to
7 The Binswanger/Eckel and Grossman method has been used by Binswanger (1980, 1981) in India, Barr and Genicot (2008) in Zimbabwe, Yesuf and
Bluffstone (2009) in Ethiopia, Attanasio et al. (2012) in Colombia, Cardenas and Carpenter (2013) in six Latin American cities, and by Lahno et al. (2015) and
D’Exelle and Verschoor (2015) in Uganda. The Holt and Laury (2002) method has been used by Tanaka and Munro (2014) in Uganda and Hardeweg et al.
(2013) in Thailand. In a methodological study in Senegal, the Holt and Laury (2002) method is compared with the Gneezy and Potters (1997) method by
Charness and Viceisza (2012); they ﬁnd comprehension of the former to be poor and propose the latter as an elegant alternative for subjects with low levels
of  formal education. A fourth method, eliciting the certainty equivalent value of gambles, has given rise to puzzling results in developing country contexts.
It  is used by Barr and Packard (2002, 2005) who  ﬁnd less risk aversion to be associated with higher contributions to the pension system in Chile but lower
in  Peru. Henrich and McElreath (2002) in Chile and Tanzania use the method and ﬁnd that subsistence farmers are risk loving on average (contrary to all
other  studies). Rather than taking these puzzling ﬁndings at face value, it may  be wiser to take them as pointing to possible unreliability of the method. It
may  not be realistic to expect subjects with low levels of education to reveal risk preferences in this way, which requires considerable numerical skills.
8 A drawback of the Gneezy and Potters method is that it does not allow for the measurement of risk-loving attitudes. Since our purpose is to compare
risk  aversion in the lab and in real life, this drawback is not relevant for us.
9 The rate of return on investment was  calibrated during the pilot for inducing variation in behaviour, and the probabilities of success and failure were
equalised to avoid the confound of probability weighting (Charness and Gneezy, 2010).
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Table  1
Main variables used in the analysis.
Variable Measurement
Fertiliser Household (HH) purchased fertiliser in past 5 years (dummy)
Cash crops HH grows cash crops using appropriate inputs (dummy)
Output sold Proportion of agricultural output sold by the HH
Risk aversion (game) CRRA coefﬁcient inferred from investment behaviour in experiment
Risk aversion (q’aire) Hypothetical willingness to invest (1 to most risk averse 6)
Wealth First principal component in a PCA of the HH’s assets
Credit constrained HH wanted to borrow in the past 2 years but could not (dummy)
Female Participant is female (dummy)
Age Participant’s age in years
Years of education Participant’s years of education
Own  workforce Number of HH members aged 15–69 working on own farm
Off-farm employment Any HH member is in paid employment (dummy)
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wAgricultural extension Advised by agricultural extension ofﬁcer in the past 2 years (dummy)
Access to information HH possesses means for obtaining market information (dummy)
Distance to market Distance to the nearest daily market in hours
rought, it may  leave the farmer worse off than had they not bought it (Duﬂo et al., 2008, p. 486).10 In our sample area, about
5 percent of farmers have recently bought fertiliser (see Table 2), so we use in addition the more discriminating measure
f whether or not a farmer grows cash crops and purchases the appropriate inputs. Based on individual interviews with 29
xperts in the study area, we identiﬁed cash crops to be tomatoes, onions, cabbages, egg plants (aubergines) and coffee, and
he inputs to be improved seeds/seedlings, fertiliser and pesticides. Following expert advice, we say that a farmer is engaged
n risk-taking agricultural investment if he or she grows any of these crops using all of these purchased inputs.11 In previous
tudies, measures of risk-taking agricultural investment have included whether or not a farmer grows a modern crop (Liu,
013; Engle-Warnick et al., 2007), or uses any modern agricultural input (Knight et al., 2003), but key informants warned us
hat such strategies are common in the area among largely traditional farmers who otherwise adopt a safety-ﬁrst livelihoods
trategy while on a small scale trying their luck. By contrast, the combination of cash crops and the appropriate purchased
nputs indicates a livelihoods strategy that substantially deviates from traditional agriculture, in their view. Yet, to deal with
he possibility that cash crops are grown on a small scale, we also measure degree of crop market participation. Because
f heterogeneous risk preferences, as well as transaction costs, rationally choosing farmers, who  attempt to attenuate the
elfare effects of price shocks, differ in their degree of market participation (Barrett, 2008). We  compute the proportion of
he harvest that is sold or intended to be sold and use this as our measure of the individual farmer’s degree of crop market
articipation (Heltberg and Tarp, 2002).12
We  collected data on the extra investment required, compared to traditional farming, for each of the farming strategies
hat we call risk-taking in agriculture, as well as on price and yield ﬂuctuations in the past 10 years for each of the crops
oncerned, in order to assess how the expected value and variance of proﬁts of each of these strategies compare to semi-
ubsistence farming. The ﬁgures resulting from these computations are presented in Appendix B and show that each of
hese strategies leads in terms of proﬁts to worse worst outcomes, better best outcomes, a higher expected value and a
arger variance than does semi-subsistence farming, and are thus indeed riskier than traditional farming in the same way
hat investing in our experimental investment game is riskier than not investing.
.4. Wealth and other control variables
In order to detect the role of risk preferences in risk-taking agricultural investment, we control in the econometric analysis
or the factors that co-determine such investment. Some of these may  correlate with risk preferences, and omitting them
ay  bias the estimated effect of risk preferences. The selection of control variables is based on previous literature, to which
e refer for a full rationale for their inclusion (Knight et al., 2003; Vargas Hill, 2009; Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). The variables
re listed and described in Table 1. Broadly speaking, these can be divided into knowledge of and access to investment
pportunities (Female, Age, Years of education and Agricultural extension), to markets (Access to information and Distance to
arket) and to resources, including self-insurance (Wealth, Credit constrained, Own workforce and Off-farm employment). In
he context of rural Uganda, the importance of wealth for inﬂuencing investment behaviour stems from incomplete insurance
nd credit markets; assets are necessary for absorbing price and yield shocks, and as collateral for loans (Vargas Hill, 2009,
10 In addition, the return on fertiliser is often lower than it could be because a sub-optimal amount is being applied (Conley and Udry, 2010). We show in
he  appendix that even when an optimal amount is applied, purchasing fertiliser is a risky choice decision in the sense deﬁned above: a higher return on
verage  but also greater variance in returns.
11 With the exception of coffee, for which experts deemed one of (a) buying fertiliser and (b) hiring labour to be on its own sufﬁcient evidence of risk-
aking investment, whether or not other inputs are bought. Cf. Vargas Hill (2009) who uses labour allocated to coffee as an indicator of Ugandan farmers’
isk-taking behaviour.
12 When a farmer grows multiple crops, we use for this computation the local price of each crop that prevailed in the period when the bulk of the harvest
as  sold in order to convert output quantities into monetary values.
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Table  2
Summary statistics.
Variable Abbreviation Obs Mean Std. dev. Min  Max
Fertiliser fertiliser 1776 0.65 0.48 0 1
Cash  crops cash crops 1776 0.31 0.46 0 1
Output sold outp sld 1765 0.52 0.31 0 1
Risk  aversion (game) risk aver g 872 1.70 2.68 0.13 14.97
Risk  aversion (q’aire) risk aver q 1803 2.37 1.52 1 6
Wealth  wealth 1803 −0.03 2.20 −2.69 20.12
Credit  constrained credit cons 1776 0.55 0.50 0 1
Female  female 1803 0.49 0.50 0 1
Age  age 1803 40.27 13.74 18 73
Years  of education yeduc 1803 5.53 3.43 0 13
Own  workforce work f farm 1803 2.31 1.21 0 8
Off-farm employment off-farm 1803 0.18 0.38 0 1
Agricultural extension cont aes 1803 0.39 0.49 0 1
Access  to information info asset 1803 0.77 0.42 0 1
Distance to market dist mkt 1803 0.39 0.61 0 3
Computed using sampling weights.
p. 159). The method we use for computing a wealth index is based on a principal component analysis of the household’s
assets and due to Filmer and Pritchett (2001). Details of twenty-seven asset types were included in the broad categories
household’s dwelling, durable consumer goods, vehicles, farm buildings and equipment, land, and livestock.
3.5. Fieldwork implementation
Sample selection took place during June–August and data collection during September–December 2012. We  randomly
selected 10 sub-counties, and within each sub-county 10 villages, so 100 villages in total. In each village, we organised the
compilation of a list of all adult (18+) members by household and randomly selected up to 20 adults (some villages had
fewer than 20 eligible adults) subject to the constraint of no more than one participant per household. We  ensured that both
devising the sampling frame and the random selection process were witnessed by a broad representation of village members,
to encourage trust in the fairness of the selection process. We  assessed availability of the randomly selected individuals and
randomly replaced them if necessary (in 5.9 percent of cases). Data collection followed the same basic pattern in each sub-
county. In the week before ‘game day’ we visited all selected participants to administer a household survey questionnaire.
The experiment then took place at the end of the week in a central location (usually in a school on a non-school day); for
participants from remote villages, we organised transport.
4. Results
4.1. Summary statistics and spearman correlations
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. The ﬁgures presented here have been
computed using sampling weights that reﬂect the multistage cluster sampling described above. They are therefore unbiased
estimates of population statistics in the study area.
As mentioned, an estimated 65 percent of the population has purchased fertiliser in the past ﬁve years. According to
the more restrictive measure, growing cash crops with recommended inputs, 31 percent of the population are risk-takers
in their investment behaviour. In terms of constraints on such investment, it is worth noting that 55 percent say they had
wanted to borrow in the past two years but could not. Our alternative measure of risk-taking in agriculture, crop market
participation, indicates that on average 52 percent of the harvest is sold or intended to be sold.
All of our respondents answered the hypothetical investment question, whereas those in a randomly selected ﬁve sub-
counties (872 individuals) also participated in the investment game described above. Risk aversion is much higher in the
game. The mean CRRA coefﬁcient equals 1.70, whereas it is 1.06 according to the hypothetical question (the table reports
the mean of the ordinal measure instead, which we  prefer to use in the analysis; see Section 3.2). A paired two-sided t-test,
restricted to those for whom we have both measures, shows that the mean CRRA coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly higher in the
game than in the questionnaire (t = 6.91 ; p = 0.0000). A comparison of median ﬁgures suggests the same. Median investment
in the game is 6/20 counters (cf. Fig. 1a). By contrast, median investment in the questionnaire is option 2; 62.3 percent
choose option 1 or 2, i.e. invest 80,000 or the maximum 100,000 (see Fig. 1b).
In Table 3, spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients are reported for the variables that are the focus of the analysis. There
are four patterns worth drawing attention to. First, the hypothesis that incentivised and hypothetical risk aversion are
independent cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. Second, wealth is not signiﬁcantly correlated with either of these
measures. Third, experimentally incentivised risk aversion is not signiﬁcantly correlated with risk-taking in agriculture on
any measure, whereas hypothetical risk aversion is signiﬁcantly correlated with all three measures, and so, to a much greater
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Table 3
Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients.
Fertiliser Cash crops Output sold Risk aversion game Risk aversion (q’aire) Wealth
Fertiliser 1
Cash crops 0.4101 1
(0.0000)
Output sold 0.2713 0.4441 1
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Risk aversion (game) 0.0099 0.016 0.0106 1
(0.7710) (0.6390) (0.7565)
Risk aversion (q’aire) −0.0788 −0.0971 −0.104 0.0548 1
(0.0208) (0.0044) (0.0023) (0.1082)
Wealth 0.2867 0.2666 0.3268 −0.0185 −0.0415 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5874) (0.2240)
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egree, is wealth. Fourth, all three measures of risk-taking in agriculture are strongly correlated with each other. The overall
uggestion is that wealth strongly and risk aversion weakly matters for risk-taking in agriculture; and that experiments are
 poor method for capturing the relevant risk aversion. However, potentially important confounds such as credit constraints
eed to be controlled for before we can draw any ﬁrm conclusions.
.2. Regression analysis
Tables 4–6 report regression analysis of the three measures of risk-taking in agriculture. We  restrict the analysis to those
ho are decision makers about their households’ farms. For each measure, six models are presented. The key independent
ariable in the ﬁrst two models is risk aversion (the coefﬁcient of CRRA) according to behaviour in the investment game
n the experiment; that in the next four models hypothetical risk aversion: an ordinal measure from 1 to 6, with 6 being
he most risk averse, representing the six options in our hypothetical investment question. For both risk aversion measures,
e ﬁrst present a model in which wealth is the only household-level control, and next a model that includes the full set of
ontrols. Because the incentivised risk aversion measure was  obtained for a sub-sample, columns 5 and 6 present models
n which the performance of the hypothetical risk aversion measure is tested in that same restricted sample. All models
resented control for village-level ﬁxed effects.
Strikingly, experimentally measured risk aversion is only signiﬁcant in the fertiliser regressions, whereas hypothetical
isk aversion is signiﬁcant in regressions for all three measures. This result tends to be robust to adding control variables and
o restricting the sample. The ﬁnding that risk aversion obtained through a questionnaire is a good all-round predictor of real-
ife caution in various domains echoes that of Dohmen et al. (2011). It is interesting that investment behaviour in the game
nly signiﬁcantly predicts real-life behaviour that is ‘most like it’. The decision to buy fertiliser is a straightforward investment
ecision that raises both the expected proﬁt and the spread of possible proﬁts within an existing livelihoods strategy (cf.
ection 3.3), which resembles the one-dimensional investment decision subjects are asked to take in the laboratory. Decisions
o grow cash crops or to grow for the market more broadly, on the other hand, are complex, multi-dimensional decisions
hat invoke not only risk preferences but also the nebulous notion of entrepreneurship. Section 5 offers some reﬂections
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Table  4
Probit regression of fertiliser purchase.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk aversion (game) −0.0485*** −0.0493***
(0.0172) (0.0171)
Risk aversion (q’aire) −0.0990*** −0.0623** −0.115*** −0.0758**
(0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0325) (0.0345)
Wealth  0.218*** 0.147*** 0.199*** 0.123*** 0.212*** 0.141***
(0.0335) (0.0388) (0.0234) (0.0258) (0.0330) (0.0382)
Credit  constrained −0.235** −0.252*** −0.222**
(0.106) (0.0776) (0.105)
Female  −0.0944 −0.104 −0.0768
(0.112) (0.0783) (0.112)
Years  of education 0.0123 0.00177 0.0125
(0.0178) (0.0126) (0.0178)
Age  −0.0161*** −0.0127*** −0.0150***
(0.00403) (0.00286) (0.00400)
Own  workforce 0.0547 0.0384 0.0503
(0.0435) (0.0327) (0.0440)
Off-farm employment −0.0876 −0.175* −0.0761
(0.144) (0.102) (0.144)
Agricultural extension 0.248** 0.261*** 0.221**
(0.110) (0.0804) (0.111)
Access  to information 0.383*** 0.418*** 0.418***
(0.135) (0.0983) (0.134)
Distance to market 0.143 0.0232 0.164
(0.254) (0.176) (0.254)
Constant 1.124* 0.485 0.245 0.473 1.410** 0.564
(0.625) (0.504) (0.448) (0.406) (0.656) (0.503)
Observations 830 816 1582 1561 842 828
Wald  2 168.30 215.34 354.68 424.72 179.44 220.77
Prob  > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo  R2 0.219 0.263 0.224 0.261 0.225 0.263
Dependent variable: fertiliser.
Maximum likelihood probit estimation; marginal probability effects reported.
Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroskedasticity using the sandwich estimator of variance.
Controls included but not reported are dummies for village (all models), and for various recent shocks (models 2, 4, 6).
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.*** p < 0.01.
on why hypothetical risk aversion might capture the latter type of decisions better than risk aversion in a lab-in-the-ﬁeld
experiment.
The discrepancy between the simple correlation analysis reported above, which returns an insigniﬁcant spearman corre-
lation coefﬁcient between fertiliser purchase and experimental risk aversion, and the multiple regression analysis reported
here, in which the relationship is robustly signiﬁcant, strongly suggests the importance of controlling for potentially con-
founding factors. Although not the focus of this paper, the performance of the control variables is worth brieﬂy pointing out.
Wealth, which as mentioned in Section 3.4 is expected to matter in a context of incomplete credit and insurance markets, is
very highly signiﬁcant in all regressions.13 Being credit-constrained, as well as having had dealings with an agricultural exten-
sion ofﬁcer, matters for fertiliser purchase, but not robustly so for the other risk-taking-in-agriculture measures, whereas
being female matters for these other ones, but not for buying fertiliser. In this context, domestic responsibilities, as well
as limited access to networks through which knowledge of and resources for investment opportunities are obtained, are
known to impede women’s involvement in lucrative agriculture (FOWODE, 2012). The contrast between the signiﬁcance of
the coefﬁcient on the female dummy  in the regressions for growing cash crops/any crops for the market on the one hand, and
its non-signiﬁcance in fertiliser regressions on the other, is in line with this contextual information: when access to ﬁnance
is controlled for, women are not less likely to take the relatively straightforward decision to buy fertiliser, but are less likely
to embark on livelihoods strategies that require access to various resources (including labour in peak time), complex infor-
mation and considerable time. Finally, having the means to obtain market information is signiﬁcant throughout, the older
invest less, formal education never matters, and nor (in this context) do the other controls suggested by the literature.13 In theory, wealth could be a determinant of risk aversion. However, because we cannot reject independence of wealth and risk aversion (see Section 4.1),
we  take wealth to be a straightforward proxy for the means available for ﬁnancing investment, important in context given incomplete insurance and credit
markets (see Section 3.4).
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Table  5
Probit regression of growing cash crops with recommended inputs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk aversion (game) −0.000839 0.00418
(0.0189) (0.0210)
Risk aversion (q’aire) −0.0926*** −0.0526** −0.109*** −0.0683*
(0.0244) (0.0260) (0.0361) (0.0391)
Wealth 0.215*** 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.143*** 0.206*** 0.187***
(0.0299) (0.0377) (0.0217) (0.0265) (0.0298) (0.0371)
Credit constrained 0.121 −0.0489 0.111
(0.117) (0.0768) (0.116)
Female −0.566*** −0.442*** −0.521***
(0.120) (0.0764) (0.118)
Years of education 0.0121 0.0152 0.0141
(0.0198) (0.0132) (0.0196)
Age  −0.0178*** −0.0134*** −0.0151***
(0.00451) (0.00298) (0.00447)
Own  workforce −0.0108 0.0103 −0.0165
(0.0519) (0.0333) (0.0509)
Off-farm employment 0.0124 −0.0549 0.0112
(0.152) (0.101) (0.149)
Agricultural extension 0.0929 0.164** 0.0825
(0.119) (0.0772) (0.118)
Access to information 0.442*** 0.396*** 0.468***
(0.171) (0.109) (0.171)
Distance to market −0.00482 −0.237 −0.00838
(0.263) (0.182) (0.264)
Constant −0.452 −0.648 −0.352 −0.948* −0.845 −0.672
(0.567) (0.534) (0.513) (0.493) (0.642) (0.528)
Observations 780 768 1673 1650 791 779
Wald 2 128.08 178.23 297.95 376.59 136.02 175.55
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.178 0.250 0.188 0.236 0.179 0.241
Dependent variable: cash crops.
Maximum likelihood probit estimation; marginal probability effects reported.
Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroskedasticity using the sandwich estimator of variance.
Controls included but not reported are dummies for village (all models), and for various recent shocks (models 2, 4, 6).
* p < 0.10.
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.3. Robustness checks and additional analyses
We  performed three additional analyses in order to check the robustness of our main results and to gain insights into the
actors responsible for the difference in explanatory power of hypothetical and experimental risk aversion.14 We  summarise
hese here.15
First, we investigated whether the heaped nature of the investment choices in the experiment exerts an inﬂuence: observe
he relative frequency of 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20 counters in Fig. 1a. Mimicking responses to the hypothetical question, we  grouped
xperimental responses into six categories: 0–3, 4–7, 8–11, 12–14, 15–17 and 18–20 counters invested. We  then tested the
oint signiﬁcance of the dummies representing these categories and found exactly the same pattern of signiﬁcance as across
ables 4–6.
Second, we investigated whether converting responses to the hypothetical investment question into CRRA matters for
he performance of hypothetical risk attitudes in the regressions. If so, this could give a clue about the role of loss aversion,
ince loss aversion is captured by the ordinal variable representing the hypothetical risk attitudes but not by the CRRA. We
ound that hypothetical CRRA is signiﬁcant in the fertiliser regression but not in the other two. Looking at Table A1, it can be
een that the probability of losses, as well as their average magnitude, is much smaller for fertiliser than for growing cash
rops. This suggests that for explaining the latter, risk attitudes need to include loss aversion.
Third, we investigated the inﬂuence of the stringency of our classiﬁcation of farmers as risk-takers in their invest-
ent behaviour, in Table 5. We  loosened the classiﬁcation to include all farmers who  grow cash crops, whether or not
he recommended inputs are used. We  found the same pattern of signiﬁcance as in Table 5.
14 We also investigated and dismissed the possibility of multicollinearity by regressing our risk aversion measures on the (other) regressors in our main
nalyses reported in Tables 4–6.
15 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these three analyses.
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Table  6
Tobit regression of proportion of harvest grown for the market.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk aversion (game) −0.0000633 0.000528
(0.00404) (0.00378)
Risk aversion (q’aire) −0.0177*** −0.00773 −0.0265*** −0.0172**
(0.00593) (0.00568) (0.00804) (0.00778)
Wealth 0.0434*** 0.0346*** 0.0402*** 0.0275*** 0.0426*** 0.0341***
(0.00597) (0.00673) (0.00388) (0.00431) (0.00577) (0.00655)
Credit constrained −0.0192 −0.0413** −0.0167
(0.0231) (0.0173) (0.0231)
Female −0.111*** −0.118*** −0.106***
(0.0234) (0.0174) (0.0234)
Years of education 0.00424 0.00368 0.00474
(0.00404) (0.00294) (0.00404)
Age  −0.00198** −0.00155** −0.00163*
(0.000901) (0.000675) (0.000915)
Own  workforce −0.00929 −0.0140* −0.0106
(0.00958) (0.00721) (0.00965)
Off-farm employment −0.00821 −0.0126 −0.00785
(0.0314) (0.0228) (0.0314)
Agricultural extension 0.0309 0.0388** 0.0261
(0.0241) (0.0171) (0.0240)
Access to information 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.120***
(0.0327) (0.0244) (0.0327)
Distance to market −0.0883 −0.445 −0.108
(0.177) (0.279) (0.176)
Constant 0.480*** 0.380** 0.693*** 0.797*** 0.550*** 0.422**
(0.105) (0.177) (0.0786) (0.105) (0.104) (0.175)
Observations 848 834 1736 1711 848 834
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.265 0.162 0.231 0.195 0.271
Dependent variable: outp sld.
Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroskedasticity using the sandwich estimator of variance.
Controls included but not reported are dummies for village (all models), and for various recent shocks (models 2, 4, 6).
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
4.4. Predicted probability of fertiliser purchase
Risk preferences measured in a ﬁeld experiment are thus not associated with agricultural livelihoods strategies that
through commercialisation seek higher proﬁts while allowing greater variation in net revenues: growing cash crops with
the appropriate purchased inputs, and growing for the market more generally. For the one decision for which they matter,
we next assess their quantitative importance. Fig. 2a and b plot predicted probabilities of fertiliser purchase along the actual
range of incentivised risk aversion (using estimated coefﬁcients of model 1 in Table 4) and hypothetical risk aversion (model 3
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n Table 4), ﬁxing other covariates at their means.16 For incentivised risk aversion, when we  move along the CRRA coefﬁcient
ange from one extreme to the other, the predicted probability of fertiliser purchase drops from 63.5 to 60 percent. For
ypothetical risk aversion, the least risk averse are 67 percent likely to buy fertiliser, the most risk averse 58.5 percent. Risk
version, however measured, thus plays a modest but non-trivial role in this particular real-world investment decision.
. Discussion and conclusions
A challenge for studies of this kind, in which experimental behaviour is compared with that in life, is to identify close-
nough real-world analogues. For a region in which self-sufﬁciency in farming is still common, we  took real-world risk-taking
o be various modes of engagement with markets for inputs and/or outputs. We  ensured that the real-world risk-taking
onsidered offers both a higher expected value and higher variance than safer alternatives and minimised the potential
ole of confounding factors by selecting a representative sample from a homogeneous area, while controlling in regression
nalysis for wealth and other co-determinants of investment decisions. Experimentally measured risk aversion, once other
elevant factors are controlled for, is signiﬁcantly associated with fertiliser purchase, but not with more involved risk-taking
n agriculture. Whereas fertiliser purchase does not necessitate much engagement with market forces—it can be like dipping
 toe in the water—our other measures are about embracing market participation. One measure we  considered is whether
armers grow lucrative cash crops that require for their success a range of purchased inputs; and the other measures degree
f participation in output markets. In contrast to our experimental measure, a hypothetical willingness to take risks is
ssociated with all our measures of real-world risk-taking.
We interpret our ﬁndings as follows. First, both experimental risky choice and fertiliser purchase may  well be narrowly
racketed decisions, and comparable behaviour to be expected. It is plausible that fertiliser purchase, which can be com-
ined if the farmer so wishes with traditional agriculture, is a separately considered decision, whereas embracing market
articipation, compared to traditional semi-subsistence agriculture, involves a radical overhaul, so is more likely to be a
roadly bracketed decision, considered as part of an overall livelihoods strategy. Fertiliser purchase, like risk-taking in the
nvestment game, is a straightforward investment that can be applied on a modest scale; in both cases, once the ‘rules of the
ame’ are understood, it is easy to see that a higher expected return is offered in exchange for larger variance. Throughout
heir careers, farmers in our study area will take the decision whether or not to apply fertiliser a large number of times. A
armer who is the primary decision maker on his or her farm for, say, 35 years, will take this decision two seasons/year times
5 years equals 70 times. Each time the decision is taken, the likelihood of a ﬁnancial loss is about 10 percent (implied by
he ﬁgures in Table A1) which by a farmer operating close to a subsistence threshold may  well be considered to be a serious
isk. However, the rate of return on investment on fertiliser per season is 117 percent (for comparison: the typical interest
ate for an agricultural loan is about 45 percent per season), and the likelihood that summed over 70 seasons a loss results is
egligible. A series of identical independent gambles yielding an attractive amalgamated gamble should render each of the
ndividual gambles attractive, unless psychological or other factors are at work that cause the decision-maker to consider
he gambles in isolation. Since fertiliser use is far from universal, this suggests narrow bracketing. The near-universal risk
version in the investment game is suggestive of the same (cf. Section 2).
Second, there is also the possibility that heterogeneous risk preferences help explain why experimentally measured
isk aversion is not associated with more involved real-life risk-taking, the growing of crops for the market by farmers
hose comparatively safe alternative is subsistence agriculture. Perhaps it helps to think of such risk-taking farmers as
ntrepreneurs: prepared to orient their ‘business strategy’ towards exposure to market forces (Barrett, 2008). There is some
vidence that the relationship between entrepreneurship and risk preferences is not straightforward. In one study, part-time
ntrepreneurs were found to be more risk averse (experimentally measured) than non-entrepreneurs, whereas full-time
ntrepreneurs were less risk averse than either group (Elston et al., 2005), suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity may
elp explain the absence of a link in our sample between a market orientation in real life and experimental risk-taking.
Third, the discrepancy in correspondence between experimental and various real-life domains of decision-making also
uggests domain-speciﬁc risk-taking, which is in line with existing evidence. Using the likelihood to engage in various risky
ehaviours, elicited through questionnaires, Hanoch et al. (2006) show that individuals who  engage in recreational risks
e.g. gambling) do not necessarily take more risk than others in other domains. It is thus conceivable that those more prone
o recreational gambling or similar thrill-seeking behaviour are ceteris paribus less risk averse in the experiment, but not
ess risk averse in (all) their livelihoods strategies. Likewise, for all we know, entrepreneurs could be relatively risk-seeking
n strategic decisions and relatively cautious in operational ones, the latter of which are more closely mimicked in the
xperiment. The general point is that experimental risk-taking appears to be a poor proxy for entrepreneurship and that
here are good reasons why that might be the case.By contrast, the hypothetical willingness to invest is signiﬁcantly associated with all three risk-taking-in-agriculture
easures.17 As explained in Section 4.3, this could hint at the role of loss aversion, since the hypothetical investment mea-
ure involves not only larger stakes but also losses. At the same time, we cannot reject independence of experimental and
16 Using any of the other models gives very similar results. For reasons of exposition, Fig. 2a does not show a CRRA coefﬁcient higher than 5; it thereby
xcludes 6.3 percent of subjects.
17 Maccrimmon and Wehrung (1990) report similar ﬁndings for business executives.
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hypothetical willingness to invest.18 Moreover, in our sample risk aversion is considerably higher in the experiment than
in response to the hypothetical question. As in Holt and Laury (2002)’s seminal study, subjects in our sample display con-
siderably less risk aversion in hypothetical, high pay-off risky choice problems than when confronted with the moderate
pay-offs of a lab experiment. Since the response to the hypothetical question nonetheless predicts all real-life risk-taking,
it is likely to capture a broader predisposition than risk preferences alone, such as entrepreneurship, a readiness to engage
with market forces.
The evidence we ﬁnd for domain-speciﬁc risk-taking is of course not at odds with a choice-bracketing explanation:
dissimilar bracketing across domains can help explain diverse risky choice behaviour (cf. Thaler, 1999). The general lesson
we take from our study is that an experiment may  be good at capturing risky choice behaviour in those realms of real life
that are ‘quite like it’: where narrow bracketing is to be expected. The risk preferences revealed in this way  are not absent
from other domains but invisible because of broader choice brackets.
Appendix A. Experimental instructions (abbreviated)
[Welcome and general introduction and instructions]
There are 20 counters spread out on this table. Each counter is worth 400 Shillings so 20 times 400 equals 8000 shillings.
These 20 counters represent the 8000 shillings on the voucher which you have been given a few weeks ago. That money is
yours and you can do with it exactly what you like.
For example, you could decide to do nothing with it. That means we  give you 8000 actual shillings and you can take those
8000 shillings home.
But we’re also giving you the opportunity to invest some or all of that money. Let me  show you what happens if you
decide to invest.
For example, let’s say you decided to invest 4000 shillings. You would then take 10 counters (remember, each counter
represents 400 shillings) and you would place them here, right next to the beaker.
Now, we would then toss this coin that has A written on one side and B on the other. We  put it in the beaker, put the
lid on top, shake it and then we put the beaker upside down, like this; we  remove the beaker: and which side of the coin
shows?
It’s [A/B]. That means the investment [is successful/failed]. So there are 2 possibilities: the investment can succeed or fail.
It succeeds when A comes up; it fails when B comes up. Now let me  explain what success and failure mean.
If the investment succeeds, we triple what you have invested. So since you had invested 4000, we  give you back three
times 4000 equals 12,000 [count out cash next to invested counters]. We  add that to the money you had not invested (4000)
[count out cash next to uninvested counters], so you go home with 4000 + 12,000 = 16,000 [count out total cash].
Now, what happens if the investment fails? Your investment failing means you lose all of it. In this case you go home
with the money that you didn’t invest. So you will take home 4000 [count out cash next to uninvested counters].
So remember, if your investment succeeds (that is when A comes up) you receive three times the amount you invested
PLUS the money you did not invest. And if your investment fails (that is when B comes up), you keep the money you did not
invest, but nothing else. I’ll give you a few more examples of how that would work out.
[some worked examples]
So, you should feel free to invest any number of counters you choose: you can invest zero counters; you can invest 20
counters, or any number of counters between zero and 20.
[opportunity to ask questions for clariﬁcation; we  then ask some control questions]
[subject decision and resolution]
Appendix B. Proﬁtability calculations
We  obtained costs, price and yields data for the past 10 years for all pertinent crops from agricultural experts in the area
(see Section 3.3) and performed proﬁtability calculations for a typical farm household: they grow maize inter-cropped with
beans on an acre of land, and buy no agricultural inputs other than maize seeds, for which they pay 50,000 shillings/season.
According to the agricultural experts we interviewed, this would sustain a family of 5–8 people so long as richer clan
members help provide for their subsistence needs in lean years, which in exchange for various services is common in the
region. Barring disasters such as landslides, major illnesses or personal accidents, the worst outcome for such a household
is thus an increase in obligations towards relatives, which we normalise as proﬁts per season of zero. We  computed for each
of the scenarios described in the main text and summarised in Table A1:
Extra costs per season per acre: the fertiliser, pesticides, improved seeds and hiring of labour required compared to
traditional agriculture.
Worst and best-case scenarios: based on prices and yields that have prevailed in the area over the past 10 years. In a
best(worst)-case scenario all yields are set at their highest (lowest) values, prices for crops sold at their highest (lowest)
18 Anderson and Mellor (2009) report similar ﬁndings of a lack of assocation between risk-taking in incentivised gambles and hypothetical gambles, but
it  depends on how the latter are framed, as well as on subject type.
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Table  A1
Proﬁtability calculations.
Scenario Extra costs Worst-case proﬁts Best-case EV St. dev.
Traditional 0 0 1.30 0.65 0.38
+  fertiliser 0.18 −0.18 1.89 0.86 0.60
Tomatoes + inputs 0.91 −1.66 3.34 0.84 1.44
Onions + inputs 0.32 −0.92 2.88 0.98 1.10
Cabbages + inputs 0.18 −0.77 2.87 1.05 1.05
Coffee  + fertiliser 0.44 −0.19 3.51 1.66 1.07
Average cash crops 0.46 −0.88 3.15 1.13 1.16
.25  land for growing for market 0.12 −0.22 1.76 0.77 0.57
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G.5  land for growing for market 0.23 −0.44 2.23 0.89 0.77
.75  land for growing for market 0.35 −0.66 2.69 1.01 0.97
igures are in millions of shillings per acre per agricultural season.
alues and prices for crops bought (for subsistence, where appropriate) at their lowest (highest) values. Subsistence needs
ere set equal to the normal beans and maize yields for the traditional farm household indicated. The last three scenarios
ndicated in the table are weighted averages of the traditional scenario and the mean of the cash crops scenarios, with the
eights determined by the proportion of the land allocated to the growing of cash crops.
The expected value and variance of proﬁts,  assuming a continuously uniform distribution in the range from worst to
est-case proﬁts.
ppendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
.jebo.2016.05.009.
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